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COULD TUSKEGEE HAPPEN TODAY? 
JERRY MENIKOFF* 
The federally financed Tuskegee Study of African American men with 
syphilis casts a long shadow on the conduct of research involving human 
subjects in the United States.  Even seventy-five years after the study began 
and thirty-five years after it was publicly exposed by an enterprising 
reporter,1 overstating its impact remains difficult.  In 1997, while issuing a 
formal apology to the eight remaining survivors of the study, President 
Clinton characterized the study with these words: 
[These survivors] are a living link to a time not so very long ago that many 
Americans would prefer not to remember, but we dare not forget.  It was a 
time when our nation failed to live up to its ideals, when our nation broke 
the trust with our people that is the very foundation of our democracy.  It is 
not only in remembering that shameful past that we can make amends and 
repair our nation, but it is in remembering that past that we can build a 
better present and a better future.2 
The spectacle of federal researchers standing by and watching hundreds of 
poor black men suffer the ravages of syphilis while denying them 
information about a newly discovered treatment had a profound effect on 
 
* Director, Office of Human Subjects Research, and Bioethicist, Department of Bioethics, 
National Institutes of Health; Associate Professor of Law, Ethics & Medicine, University of 
Kansas (on leave).  The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the policy of the National Institutes of Health or the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.  I am grateful to Robert Levine and Phil Rubin for engaging with me in a 
debate about these issues during The Great Debate: The Tension Between IRB Review and 
Academic Freedom/the First Amendment, conducted at the Public Responsibility in Medicine & 
Research (PRIM&R) 2007 Annual Human Research Protection Program Conference held on 
December 3, 2007 in Boston, Massachusetts. 
 1. See Remembering Tuskegee: Syphilis Study Still Provokes Disbelief, Sadness, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO, July 25, 2002, www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/jul/tuskegee/ 
(last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter NPR, Remembering Tuskegee] (describing Associated 
Press reporter Jean Heller’s July 25, 1972 story that exposed the study). 
 2. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President 
in Apology for Study Done in Tuskegee (May 16, 1997), at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/ 
New/Remarks/Fri/19970516-898.html (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter Presidential 
Apology]. 
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the development of rules to ensure that no such “shameful” episode could 
happen again in the United States. 
Given this past experience, it is more than somewhat surprising to 
discover that leaders and academics at the highest and most respected 
levels are supporting regulatory reforms and interpretations that would, in 
effect, allow modern-day researchers to conduct studies that could duplicate 
in large part the core wrongs that took place in the Tuskegee Study.  
Specifically, these movements would lead to a particular and relatively 
narrow interpretation of the duties that a researcher owes to research 
subjects.  Thus far, these movements have not highlighted their possible 
impact on allowing Tuskegee-like studies to take place.  This Article explains 
that impact and brings greater awareness to these important changes that 
have been taking place largely under the radar. 
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the facts of the Tuskegee Study 
and the federal regulations its disclosure prompted.  Part II describes the 
recent initiative to revise the regulations to lessen their impact on certain 
types of so-called low-risk research based on the allegation that, among 
other things, the current regulations violate the First Amendment.  Part III 
describes the recent debate about the conduct of certain types of public 
health studies and the issues that debate has highlighted regarding the 
duties owed by researchers to research subjects.  Part IV demonstrates the 
impact that both of these developments would have on modern-day 
researchers’ ability to conduct a Tuskegee-like study and explores whether 
these developments are acceptable in our society.  The Article concludes 
that the regulatory system is far from perfect and should be reformed to 
minimize wasted efforts and avoid the creation of unnecessary barriers to 
conducting research while still recognizing the important basic duties to 
disclose risks, including those not created by the researchers, to research 
subjects. 
I.  THE TUSKEGEE STUDY AND THE PATH TO THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
The Tuskegee Study began in 1932, when researchers at the U.S. Public 
Health Service partnered with the Tuskegee Institute to learn more about the 
natural pathology of syphilis.3  The disease had long been referred to as 
“the great mimic” because it has the ability to imitate the symptoms of many 
other diseases.4  Its symptoms change over the course of long periods of 
 
 3. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE SYPHILIS STUDY 
AT TUSKEGEE: THE TUSKEGEE TIMELINE (2008), at www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm (last 
visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter TUSKEGEE TIMELINE]. 
 4. LOIS N. MAGNER, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 227 (2nd ed. 2005); CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC FACT SHEET: SYPHILIS, at WHAT IS SYPHILIS? (2007), available at 
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time, producing three distinct stages of infection: primary, secondary, and 
late or latent.5  Accordingly, when the study began, researchers had very 
good reasons to want to learn more about the consequences of being 
infected with syphilis. 
The study enrolled 399 black men who had latent syphilis and 201 
black men without the disease to serve as the control group.6  The subjects 
were told merely that they had “bad blood,” and at no time during the 
decades-long study were those infected with the disease ever informed that 
they had syphilis.7  The government physicians conducting the study went to 
great lengths to ensure that no one who interacted with the subjects told 
them they had syphilis.8  One reason for withholding that information was to 
minimize the likelihood that the subjects would obtain treatment for the 
disease.9  Even when the study began, researchers knew that existing 
treatments, such as the use of arsenic compounds, could substantially 
reduce symptoms.10  Furthermore, beginning in the 1940s, the medical 
community determined that penicillin therapy was an even more effective 
treatment.  However, that treatment was also withheld.11 
On July 25, 1972, Associated Press reporter Jean Heller brought the 
study massive public exposure.12  Major newspapers throughout the nation 
 
www.cdc.gov/std/syphilis/syphilis-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter CDC 
FACT SHEET]. 
 5. See CDC FACT SHEET, supra note 4 (describing the symptoms of each stage). 
 6. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
STUDY AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL 12 (1973) (quoting VENEREAL DISEASE BRANCH, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE TUSKEGEE STUDY (1972)), 
available at www.research.usf.edu/cs/library/docs/finalreport-tuskegeestudyadvisorypanel.pdf 
(last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 7. TUSKEGEE TIMELINE, supra note 3. 
 8. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 5 (1993) (stating 
that “neither the interns nor the subjects knew what the study involved”).  CARL H. COLEMAN ET 
AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 41 (2005) (quoting and 
describing various accounts of the study and the information withheld from the subjects); FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 14; TUSKEGEE TIMELINE, supra note 3. 
 9. JONES, supra note 8, at 5; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 14; TUSKEGEE TIMELINE, 
supra note 3. 
 10. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.  In 1932, existing data showed that 35% of 
untreated patients with late latent syphilis were disease-free and in good health, compared to 
85% of those who had received treatment.  Id. (citing Joseph Earle Moore et al., Cooperative 
Clinical Studies in the Treatment of Syphilis: Latent Syphilis, 13 VENEREAL DISEASE INFO. 317, 
379 (1932)). 
 11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12; see also NPR, Remembering Tuskegee, supra 
note 1. 
 12. NPR, Remembering Tuskegee, supra note 1. 
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quickly picked up her article.13  As part of the fallout from the exposure, the 
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) made a public pledge “to investigate 
the circumstances surrounding” the study.14  In fulfilling that pledge, the 
Assistant Secretary, only two months later, established the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel to investigate several issues.15  The nine-
member committee was asked to determine: (1) whether the study was 
justified at the time it began and whether it should have been continued 
after penicillin became widely available (in the 1950s); (2) whether the study 
should be continued, and, if not, how to best terminate it in a way that 
respected the participants; and (3) “whether existing policies to protect the 
rights of patients participating in health research conducted or supported by 
[HEW were] adequate and effective” and, if necessary, what improvements 
could be implemented.16 
The panel’s conclusions on the final issue, which it released in a 1973 
report, were rather damning of the then-existing policies to protect human 
research subjects: 
[T]he Tuskegee Syphilis Study, despite its widespread publicity was not an 
isolated phenomenon.  We believe that the revelations from Macon County 
merely brought to the surface once again the unresolved problems which 
have long plagued medical research activities.  Indeed, we hasten to add 
that although we refer in this report almost exclusively to physicians and to 
biomedical investigations, the issues we explore also arise in the context of 
non-medical investigations with human beings, conducted by psychologists, 
sociologists, educators, lawyers and others. . . . 
  Our initial determination that the protection of human research subjects 
is a current and widespread problem should not be surprising, especially in 
light of the recent Congressional hearings and bills focusing on the 
regulation of experimentation.  In the past decade the press has publicized 
and debated a number of experiments which raised ethical questions: for 
example, the injection of cancer cells into aged patients at the Jewish 
Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, the deliberate infection of mentally 
retarded children with hepatitis at Willowbrook, the development of heart 
transplantation techniques, the enormous amount of drug research 
conducted in American prisons, the whole-body irradiation treatment of 
 
 13. See, e.g., Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at 1 [hereinafter Heller, Syphilis Victims Untreated]; Jean Heller, 
U.S. Testers Let Many Die of Syphilis, WASH. POST, July 26, 1972, at A1 [hereinafter Heller, 
U.S. Testers]. 
 14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 1; see also Special, H.E.W. Will Study Syphilis Project, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1972, at 40. 
 15. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 41-42; see also Special, supra note 14. 
 16. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 1; see also Special, supra note 14. 
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cancer patients at the University of Cincinnati, the advent and spread of 
“psychosurgery,” and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study itself.17 
The panel proceeded to provide a comprehensive critique of the many holes 
in the then-existing federal regulatory system for protecting research 
subjects.18 
Within a year of the report, Congress passed the National Research Act 
of 1974 that created the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.19  The Commission 
authored The Belmont Report, which provides the foundation for the 
regulations the government subsequently adopted for protecting research 
subjects.20  Thus, the current regulatory system for protecting research 
subjects owes a great deal to the government’s response to the disclosure of 
what happened in the Tuskegee Study.21 
The current system is largely based on a set of federal regulations,22 the 
core section of which is called the “Common Rule” because most federal 
agencies that fund human subject research have adopted identical versions 
of it.23  These regulations apply to most human subject research funded by 
the federal government and also have substantial influence over much 
research that is not government funded.24  At the heart of the rules are a set 
of requirements that researchers must meet before conducting a study 
involving human subjects.  In particular, the proposed subjects must receive 
 
 17. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
 18. Id. at 29-37. 
 19. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 201, 
available at http://history.nih.gov/01docs/historical/documents/PL93-348.pdf (last visited 
May 19, 2008). 
 20. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RES., 
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, available at www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/AC/05/briefing/2005-
4178b_09_02_Belmont%20Report.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter BELMONT 
REPORT]. 
 21. For a comprehensive timeline of legislation and regulations involving human subjects, 
see Joel Sparks, Historical Resources: Timeline of Laws Related to the Protection of Human 
Subjects, National Institutes of Health, (June 2002), at http://history.nih.gov/01Docs/ 
historical/2020b.htm (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 22. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2007), available at www.hhs.gov/ 
ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.htm (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 23. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 106.  Sixteen agencies have adopted these 
regulations.  Sparks, supra note 21.  Subpart A of 45 C.F.R. Part 46, the so-called Common 
Rule, contains the Department of Health and Human Services’ basic policy for protection of 
human research subjects. 
 24. Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 406-07, 441 (2007).  
For guidance on the interpretation of 45 C.F.R. Part 46, see OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH 
PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OHRP 45 CFR PART 46 FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (FAQS), at www.hhs.gov/ohrp/45CFRpt46faq.html (last visited May 19, 2008). 
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adequate information so that they can make informed choices about 
whether to participate and can only be enrolled in a study after freely and 
voluntarily providing their informed consent.25  In addition, the balance 
between the risks to the subjects and the benefits to the subjects and society 
from conducting the study must be appropriate.26 
This regulatory system’s administrative structure is somewhat unusual in 
that an entity called an institutional review board (IRB), composed of at least 
five members with various backgrounds,27 is required to review and 
determine whether a study conforms with the regulations.28  While most 
major research institutions in the United States have one or more IRBs, 
researchers can also hire independent IRBs.29  Every year in the United 
States, thousands of IRBs review many thousands of research studies.30 
Consistent with the previously quoted conclusions from the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel’s 1973 Report that biomedical 
research is not the only potentially problematic type of research,31 the 
regulations are not limited to a particular type of research. They include a 
broad definition of what constitutes “research” and of when research 
involves “human subjects.”32  On the other hand, the regulations do 
recognize that not all research requires the same level of scrutiny.33  Thus, 
certain types of research, such as most research involving surveys or 
questionnaires, is exempt from most of the requirements.34  Instead, such 
low-risk research is merely required to comply with the less-specific ethical 
principles embodied in The Belmont Report.35 
 
 25. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also JERRY MENIKOFF WITH EDWARD P. RICHARDS, WHAT THE 
DOCTOR DIDN’T SAY: THE HIDDEN TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL RESEARCH 8, 85, 96-97 (2006). 
 26. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2); MENIKOFF, supra note 25, at 51-60. 
 27. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). 
 28. See id. § 46.103(b). 
 29. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS 3 (1998), available at 
www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00192.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 30. Id. at i, 4. 
 31. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 (stating that issues involving human subjects 
research “also arise in the context of non-medical investigations with human beings, 
conducted by psychologists, sociologists, educators, lawyers and others”). 
 32. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d), (f); see also MENIKOFF, supra note 25, at 24-36. 
 33. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (outlining “[e]xpedited review procedures for certain kinds of 
research involving no more than minimal risk”); see also Jerry Menikoff, Where’s the Law?: 
Uncovering the Truth about IRBs and Censorship, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 791 (2007) (arguing that 
because many research studies fall into regulatory categories that are either subject to cursory 
review or not subject to review at all, the IRB system should pose minimal burden on these 
researchers in the majority of cases). 
 34. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b). 
 35. See Menikoff, supra note 33, at 795-96 (describing the Belmont Report’s reference to 
basic ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice). 
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II.  DISSATISFACTION WITH IRB “MISSION CREEP” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGE TO THE REGULATIONS 
For various reasons, in recent years both the visibility and impact of the 
federal regulations have increased.  The primary reason is the sudden burst 
in enforcement of the regulations by the federal Office for Protection from 
Research Risks (OPRR) between 1998 and 2000.36  This upswing in 
regulatory action likely was motivated, at least in part, by a June 1998 
report from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of 
Health and Human Services.37  The OIG report concluded that the system 
for protecting research subjects was in serious trouble, largely because IRBs 
were having a difficult time fulfilling their responsibilities.38  As the report 
stated, the “effectiveness of IRBs is in jeopardy.”39  Among the reasons for 
that conclusion were that (1) the research environment had changed 
dramatically from the classic model of a single investigator performing a 
study on her own; (2) IRBs were required to take on increased workloads, 
with pressures to approve studies quickly; (3) IRBs were paying insufficient 
attention to the annual “continuing review” required of previously approved 
studies; (4) IRBs were subject to growing conflicts of interest as institutional 
pressures to conduct research grew; (5) IRB members and staffs received 
relatively little training; and (6) neither IRBs nor the Department of Health 
and Human Services had a system for evaluating how effectively the IRBs 
actually protect human subjects.40 
In October 1998, OPRR took the first of several high-profile 
enforcement actions, suspending research at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s 
Medical Center in Chicago.41  During the subsequent two years, OPRR 
brought enforcement actions against a number of prominent institutions, 
most notably Duke University and the University of Pennsylvania.42  Since 
2001, after OPRR’s reorganization that gave it greater independence and 
renamed it the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), the level of 
such enforcement actions has dropped back to the pre-1998 level.43  
Nonetheless, the short burst of activity was sufficient to put the human 
research protections program on the radar screens of most institutions that 
 
 36. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 57-58. 
 37. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM (June 1998), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/ 
oei-01-97-00193.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter OIG, TIME FOR REFORM]; see 
also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 57. 
 38. OIG, TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 37, at 4-9. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. at 4-9. 
 41. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 58. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 60-61.  
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conduct substantial amounts of human subject research.  As a result, 
institutions have increased internal compliance activities and have made 
greater efforts to encourage researchers to be aware of and comply with the 
rules.44 
Given that the regulations apply not solely to biomedical research, this 
increased compliance activity soon percolated down to what are generally 
perceived as the relatively low-risk types of studies, namely those in 
behavioral and social science.  Over time, various anecdotal reports began 
circulating among researchers in those fields, suggesting that IRBs would 
occasionally impose burdensome requirements on researchers.45  These 
reports eventually reached members of this group who were not only 
researchers, but also experts in regulatory issues: legal academics. 
A small panel discussion at the 2004 Association of American Law 
Schools Annual Meeting46 led some law professors to begin exploring the 
appropriateness of the federal regulations for protecting research subjects.  
In particular, the law professors raised the issue of whether the regulations 
violate the First Amendment.47  Perhaps the earliest extended work on this 
issue is Philip Hamburger’s 2004 article, entitled The New Censorship: 
Institutional Review Boards.48  Hamburger argues that “IRB laws 
unconstitutionally require licensing of speech and the press but that . . . 
doctrines of the U.S. Supreme Court have diminished the clarity of the 
Constitution’s obstacles to licensing and thus have emboldened the 
 
 44. See id. at 59.  For example, “Duke University made a number of changes in the ten 
months immediately following the four-day suspension of its authority to conduct research with 
human subjects.  These changes included: (a) increasing the number of IRBs, from one to two, 
and making plans to add at least two more; (b) sponsoring a ninety-minute course on the 
regulation and history of medical research with human subjects and requiring that all 1,350 
clinical investigators at the medical center take the course; (c) providing up to forty hours of 
training for each IRB member; (d) increasing the size of the support staff for its IRBs, from two 
full-time positions to 11; and (e) increasing the staff support budget from approximately 
$100,000 to about $1 million.” Id. 
 45. See COMM. A ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM & TENURE, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 
RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
(2006), at www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/humansubs.htm (last visited May 19, 2008) 
[hereinafter AAUP COMM. A] (giving examples of “more or less familiar horror stories” drawn 
“from experiences of prospective researchers in a variety of different disciplines in the social 
sciences and humanities”). 
 46. Association of American Law Schools, Section on Law and the Social Sciences 2004 
Annual Meeting, Institutional Review Boards and You (Jan. 5, 2004), at 
http://aalsweb.aals.org/am2004/programs/details/6360.shtml (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 271 (2004). 
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government to impose IRBs and have left academics and universities without 
the confidence to resist.”49 
Around the same time Hamburger’s article was published, the University 
of Illinois Center for Advanced Study took a prominent step to continue the 
debate about the IRB system by holding a conference on Human Subject 
Protection Regulations and Research Outside the Biomedical Sphere in 
2003.50  The conference’s purpose was described as follows: 
The invitational conference asked for advance position papers . . . 
addressing “When does a person become a human subject?” in order to 
analyze more closely who we are seeking to protect, from what, and why.  
Some of the questions considered included: 
 When a faculty member writes about students and the teaching 
process, when is that an “interaction” with human subjects that is or 
should be covered by federal research regulations? 
 Is it appropriate or a good use of resources for a central institutional 
review board to govern the questions to be asked and how records 
are kept and used by faculty and graduate students conducting oral 
history interviews? 
 Why can a journalist working for a newspaper interview and publish 
articles and books about sensitive issues, subject only to professional 
ethical guidance and legal consequences, while a journalism 
professor must additionally seek prior approval from those outside 
journalism (i.e., an IRB) for the same activities? 
 Is it good public policy to base the regulation of activities involving 
humans on where the research is performed (in terms of institutional 
affiliation or field setting), rather than on the nature of harm that 
might result? 
Nationally, these questions and others like them in anthropology, business, 
sociology, English, psychology, law, history, education, and journalism, 
among other disciplines, have been causing increasing controversy over the 
last five to 10 years.51 
The Illinois White Paper, the conference’s product, has substantially 
impacted the debate about the IRB system.  Its executive summary provides 
a good statement of a particular viewpoint: 
 
 49. Hamburger, supra note 24, at 406 n.6. 
 50. CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDY, THE ILLINOIS WHITE PAPER: IMPROVING THE SYSTEM FOR 
PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS: COUNTERACTING IRB “MISSION CREEP” 6 (2003), available at 
www.law.uiuc.edu/conferences/whitepaper/whitepaper.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) 
[hereinafter ILLINOIS WHITE PAPER]. 
 51. Id. 
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Our system of research self-regulation, designed to provide internal checks 
and balances for those who participate in research involving human 
subjects, is under considerable stress.  Study after study recently has 
reported that this is a system “in crisis,” “in jeopardy,” and in need of 
thoughtful re-examination. 
Much of this crisis has been caused by what we call mission creep, in which 
the workload of IRBs has expanded beyond their ability to handle effectively.  
Mission creep is caused by rewarding wrong behaviors, such as focusing 
more on procedures and documentation than difficult ethical questions; 
unclear definitions, which lead to unclear responsibilities; efforts to comply 
with unwieldy federal requirements even when research is not federally 
funded; exaggerated precautions to protect against program shutdowns; 
and efforts to protect against lawsuits. 
Honest IRB specialists admit that they operate under constant concern about 
the one case in a thousand that might slip through review — with the 
consequence that the other 999 receive exaggerated reviews and risk 
rejection in an effort to err on the side of caution. 
As a consequence, mission creep is causing IRBs to lose the respect and 
“buy-in” of the very people they are meant to regulate; they are misdirecting 
their energies, threatening both academic and first amendment freedoms; 
and most importantly, mission creep is taking needed resources from the 
most risky research, which truly does need IRB oversight.52 
The White Paper presents a number of specific recommendations.  First, 
it recommends conducting empirical research to gather additional 
information, both about “good” and “poor” practices.53  It suggested 
developing a “clearing house” that would provide workable solutions to 
what might otherwise appear to be inappropriate administrative barriers.54  
Second, it recommends refining the existing system to create a set of 
regulations that are better tuned to the issues raised by social and 
behavioral research.55  Finally, it recommends removing certain endeavors 
from IRB review altogether.56  The removed category might include certain 
fields, such as journalism and ethnography, and certain methodologies, 
such as oral history,57  that “pose virtually no risk to the subjects.”58 
In April 2006, the symposium entitled Censorship and Institutional 
Review Boards at Northwestern University School of Law brought together a 
 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Id. at 2, 18. 
 54. Id. at 2, 19. 
 55. ILLINOIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 3, 18-19. 
 56. Id. at 3, 22. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 3. 
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wide range of people, including those who were previously involved in 
analysis of IRB issues and others who were new to the topic but had a 
professional interest in the legal issues it raises.59  The Northwestern 
University Law Review published the symposium contributors’ work: nineteen 
articles spanning almost five hundred pages.60  The articles address topics 
ranging from the specific legal issue of whether the IRB system violates the 
First Amendment61 to anecdotal accounts of how IRBs have hindered the 
work of researchers.62  Defenders of the current system also presented their 
viewpoints.63 
The most recent, and perhaps most prominent, report examining IRB 
operation was approved in June 2006 by a subcommittee of Committee A 
on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP).64  This report, prepared by a truly stellar list of leading 
academics,65 begins by noting that the federal regulations “have generated 
an increasing number of complaints over the years, and there is a by-now 
enormous literature that points to their objectionable features.”66  After 
recounting assorted examples of demands IRBs have placed on researchers 
that range from silly to absurd, the report evaluates the system and 
proposed changes to it and makes a recommendation for policy makers.67  
The report states that “[w]hat is deeply troublesome is the fact that research 
on human subjects must obtain IRB approval whether or not it imposes a 
serious risk of harm on its subjects.”68  While some commentators have 
 
 59. James Lindgren et al., Foreword: Symposium on Censorship and Institutional Review 
Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 399 (2007), available at www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/issues/101.2.html (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 60. See Symposium, Censorship and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 399 
(2007). 
 61. See Hamburger, supra note 24; James Weinstein,  Institutional Review Boards and the 
Constitution, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 493 (2007); Philip Hamburger, Two-Dimensional Doctrine 
and Three-Dimensional Law: A Response to Professor Weinstein, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 563 
(2007); James Weinstein, The Dimensions of Constitutional Analysis: A Reply to Professor 
Hamburger, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 569 (2007). 
 62. See, e.g., Fredric L. Coe, The Costs and Benefits of a Well-Intended Parasite: A 
Witness and Reporter on the IRB Phenomenon, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 723 (2007). 
 63. See, e.g., Menikoff, supra note 33; Jonathan Moss, If Institutional Review Boards 
Were Declared Unconstitutional, They Would Have to Be Reinvented, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 801 
(2007). 
 64. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45. 
 65. The report was prepared by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; Catherine Elgin, Harvard Graduate School of Education; David A. Hyman, 
University Of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Philip E. Rubin, Yale University School Of 
Medicine and Haskins Laboratories.  Id. 
 66. Id. at 95. 
 67. Id. at 96-98. 
 68. Id. at 97. 
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suggested that all research in the social science and humanities be 
exempted from IRB review and that the system be limited to regulating “only 
biomedical research,”69  the report’s authors conclude that it would be 
inappropriate to make that change for two reasons.70  First, some social 
science research has the potential to cause significant psychological harm to 
subjects.71  Second, some biomedical research does not have the potential 
to cause any serious harm to subjects because it does not consist of bodily 
interventions and only requires obtaining survey data.72 
Accordingly, the report’s authors conclude that the best reform would 
not involve looking at the type of research, but rather at the methodology 
used in a study.73  Specifically, the authors conclude that research “whose 
methodology consists entirely of collecting data by surveys, conducting 
interviews, or observing behavior in public places [should] be exempt from 
the requirement of IRB review.”74  They note that the current regulations, in 
fact, already exempt such studies from requiring IRB review except under 
limited circumstances, but that, currently, a researcher has to file a request 
for exemption which must in turn be reviewed and approved by the IRB.75  
The report’s authors believe that studies involving these methodologies 
should, in effect, be automatically exempted, without any need to obtain 
prior approval.76 
III.  THE PUBLIC HEALTH DILEMMA AND THE DUTIES OF RESEARCHERS TO DISCLOSE 
EXISTING RISKS 
While all of the discussions were taking place concerning how the IRB 
system created inappropriate, and perhaps unconstitutional, burdens on the 
conduct of research in the social and behavioral sciences, a seemingly very 
different aspect of the system was being debated elsewhere.  An appropriate 
 
 69. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  In this context, the report mentions the famous experiment conducted by Stanley 
Milgram, where he asked subjects to control a machine that they believed would deliver pain 
to people in another room.  Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97. 
 75. Id.  This claim is not completely correct.  Nothing in the regulations requires the filing 
of a request for exemption, nor its approval by the IRB.  OHRP merely provides guidance that 
researchers should not make their own determination of exempt status.  Furthermore, even 
under OHRP’s guidance, the IRB (or even an IRB member) is not required to make the 
determination.  Rather, the guidance says that some appropriately trained person other than 
the investigator must make the determination.  See Office for Protection from Research Risks, 
Exempt Research and Research That May Undergo Expedited Review (1995), available at 
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/hsdc95-02.htm (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 76. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97. 
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introduction to this simultaneous debate is an examination of a particular 
public health lead paint study that began in inner city Baltimore in the early 
1990s.77 
At that time, many of the homes in Baltimore’s low-income, high-risk 
neighborhoods had paint with high lead content on their walls.78  It was no 
longer legal to use such paint, but the costs of fully removing the lead paint 
already on walls—often more than the value of the homes—was prohibitive 
and the existing public health laws allowed these buildings to be used as 
housing, even by families with young children.79  Indeed, poorer families in 
inner-city Baltimore often had no choice but to live in such housing. 
The Kennedy Krieger Institute, a research organization affiliated with The 
Johns Hopkins University, played a major role in earlier years performing 
landmark work to uncover the problem of lead poisoning in children.80  The 
Institute continued research in that field and, in the early 1990s, began a 
study to determine if there might be low-cost methods of reducing the risk to 
children of living in lead-contaminated housing.81  The researchers devised 
several methods to reduce those risks, each costing between $1,650 and 
$7,000, and then conducted a randomized study that assigned homes to 
one of the interventions.82  Some families were enrolled by applying the 
intervention to the home in which they were already living; others were 
enrolled when the researchers applied the interventions to vacant homes 
and asked landlords to rent the homes to families with young children.83 
Two families who participated in the study sued the Kennedy Krieger 
Institute in state court, claiming, among other things, that the researchers 
 
 77. See Joanne Pollak, The Lead-Based Paint Abatement Repair & Maintenance Study in 
Baltimore: Historic Framework and Study Design, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 89, 96 (2002), 
available at www.hopkinsmedicine.org/Press_releases/2004 (follow “Grimes v Kennedy 
Krieger Institute: Facts About the KKI Lead Paint Study” hyperlink) (last visited May 19, 2008);  
see also Tamar Lewin, U.S. Investigating Johns Hopkins Study of Lead Paint Hazard, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at A11, at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9405E1D 
F1331F937A1575BC0A9679C8B63 (last visited May 19, 2008). 
 78. KENNEDY-KRIEGER INSTITUTE, LEAD-BASED PAINT STUDY FACT SHEET (2001), at 
www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2001/SEPTEMBER/leadfactsheet.htm (last visited May 19, 
2008) [hereinafter KKI FACT SHEET]. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Pollak, supra note 77, at 93; Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 
811-12 (Md. 2001). 
 81. KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78. 
 82. Id.; see also TECHNICAL PROGRAMS BRANCH, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LEAD-BASED 
PAINT ABATEMENT AND REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE STUDY IN BALTIMORE: PRE-INTERVENTION 
FINDINGS 13, 16 (1996), available at http://epa.gov/oppt/lead/pubs/r95-012.pdf (last visited 
May 19, 2008) [hereinafter EPA STUDY] (describing study design and sample collection 
procedures). 
 83. KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78; Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813, 821. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
324 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:311 
did not obtain appropriate informed consent.84  The case reached 
Maryland’s highest state court, which issued a scathing, landmark ruling, 
condemning not only the researchers but the IRB system that approved the 
study.85  According to the court, this study was shockingly similar to many of 
the most shameful studies in history, including the Nazis having exposed 
residents in the Buchenwald concentration camp to typhus during World 
War II.86  The court included the Tuskegee Study in its list, noting that these 
studies all involved the use of especially vulnerable subjects and took 
inappropriate advantage of their vulnerabilities.87  In fact, the court’s ruling 
went beyond the allegations in the complaint and concluded that it would 
not have mattered even if there was appropriate informed consent by the 
children’s parents: “[N]o degree of parental consent, and no degree of 
furnished information to the parents could make the experiment at issue 
here, ethically or legally permissible.”88 
The court’s ruling that there was no permissible way to conduct this 
study, even if appropriate informed consent was obtained, has received 
much criticism.  Many have commented that the ruling is inconsistent with 
the existing understanding of the acceptable conditions for conducting 
research with children.  They have also noted that this study was an 
important one and relatively low risk, compared to hundreds of other studies 
that are regularly allowed to proceed in the United States with little 
controversy.89  Thus, the issue of whether this study was somehow “too risky” 
to be permissible remains unsettled. 
But a very different aspect of the study, and of the court’s opinion, is 
highly relevant to the issues discussed in this Article.  As noted above, the 
plaintiffs’ core claim was the inadequacy of informed consent, and the court 
concluded that they stated a claim on that issue and the case should be 
allowed to go to trial.90  In deciding that the plaintiffs stated a viable claim, 
the court concluded that researchers owe a variety of legal duties to 
research subjects because of the special relationship such studies normally 
 
 84. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 818. 
 85. See id. at 813-14, 817. 
 86. Id. at 816-17. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 857-58. 
 89. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz, Nontherapeutic Research with Children: Grimes v 
Kennedy Krieger Institute, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1070, 1071-72 (2002); Anna C. 
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create.91  Specifically, the court held that, under Maryland law, researchers 
“have a duty to warn [research subjects] regarding dangers present when 
the researcher has knowledge of the potential for harm to the subject and 
the subject is unaware of the danger[.]”92 
An article by two leading health law scholars, Diane Hoffmann and 
Karen Rothenberg, analyzes the court’s comments about this duty at 
length.93  Hoffmann and Rothenberg argue that, depending on how one 
interprets the court’s statements, the court might have been creating a new 
duty and one that could have troubling consequences for conducting future 
research, including important public health studies.94  At the heart of their 
analysis is the distinction between risks that are created by the researchers’ 
actions and pre-existing risks that subjects were exposed to prior to the 
researchers’ involvement and that the researchers do not alter.95  They 
acknowledge that researchers are under a duty to inform a proposed 
research subject about any risks that are created (or made worse) by 
participating in the study.96  This duty is straightforwardly embodied in the 
federal regulations’ requirement of disclosure of “any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject.”97  No one familiar with 
those rules would contend that such risks do not have to be disclosed. 
But what about risks that the researchers do not create?  In the Grimes 
case, the plaintiffs claimed that, among other things, the researchers should 
have informed them about the risk of lead exposure to their children from 
continuing to live in lead-contaminated housing,98  a risk that the 
researchers did not create.99  Many of the families were already living in 
lead-contaminated housing even before the researchers’ involvement, and 
nothing the researchers did made the risk of exposure any worse.100  Thus, 
the following question arises: Did the researchers have a duty to disclose the 
background risk, one that they did not create? 
 
 91. Id. at 841-42. 
 92. Id. at 818-19. 
 93. See Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The 
Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
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 94. Id. at 110, 130-31, 144-45. 
 95. Id. at 130. 
 96. Id. at 130-31. 
 97. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2007). 
 98. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 844 (Md. 2001). 
 99. Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 135. 
 100. Id. 
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As quoted above, the court appears to have concluded that yes, such a 
risk does have to be disclosed.101  What is especially interesting is the 
conclusion of these two distinguished scholars that the court’s recognition of 
such a duty should be considered controversial and a significant expansion 
of the duties of a researcher to a subject.102  Thus, under the scholars’ view, 
the law prior to this case would have allowed the Kennedy Krieger 
researchers to conduct their study and not inform the parents about the 
known danger of lead poisoning in children and how continuing to live in 
lead-contaminated housing is very unhealthy for children. 
Hoffmann and Rothenberg describe other scenarios that would raise 
similar ethical issues.  For example, a study might involve enrolling members 
of a population that “exposes its children to a diet without certain 
nutrients.”103  They ask whether the researcher should be “required to tell 
the subjects of the risks of such a diet.”104  They discuss a study “on the 
effects of second-hand smoke on children living in housing with parents who 
smoke” and ask whether it should “be the obligation of the researchers to 
inform the parents at the start of the research of the risks to children of 
second-hand smoke[.]”105 
Not only do Hoffmann and Rothenberg find that the court’s apparent 
recognition of a duty to disclose these background risks is a change in the 
law, but they also are seriously concerned that it may be a bad change.106  
In particular, they are concerned that such a duty may make it harder to 
conduct certain types of public health studies.107  They assert that “the real 
danger of the Court’s Opinion is the possibility that it will significantly 
reduce major public health studies that could be the basis of revising our 
public health and environmental laws.”108 
IV.  THE APPROVABILITY OF MODERN-DAY TUSKEGEES 
What do the two themes discussed in Parts II and III tell us about the 
ability to conduct a modern-day study that shares some of the core 
 
 101. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 852, 858; see also Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 
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characteristics of the Tuskegee Study?  Consider the following hypothetical 
study, which might be called “Tuskegee Today”: 
A researcher proposes to study the natural history of disease X.  It is a 
relatively rare genetic disease, but it has certain unusual characteristics.  
Due to these unusual characteristics, a better understanding of it may be 
helpful in learning more about the underlying biomedical mechanisms of 
several other more common diseases.  A treatment exists that substantially 
reduces the otherwise severe and irreversible consequences of disease X. 
The researcher has been able to find several groups of black men who have 
disease X.  They are poorly educated, have limited incomes, and do not 
have access to good healthcare.  They are not aware that an effective 
treatment for disease X exists.  The researcher proposes to conduct the study 
by having regular interviews with the subjects over a period of several years.  
He will obtain written informed consent from the subjects, describing all of 
the interviews in which subjects will participate.  The researcher does not 
plan to voluntarily tell the subjects that disease X has an effective treatment, 
though he will not lie to them if they ask about possible treatment options. 
Could researchers conduct such a study today and fully comply with the 
existing federal rules for protecting research subjects? 
Before analyzing the permissibility of Tuskegee Today, it bears 
mentioning that this hypothetical does not embody all of the wrongs that 
were involved in the actual Tuskegee Syphilis Study.  In the actual study, the 
researchers actively took steps to ensure that the subjects did not learn 
about their disease or the various treatment options.109  Without doubt, the 
deceptive aspect of the Tuskegee Study involved an active wrong—the 
researchers acted to make the subjects worse off.  The researchers, 
themselves, imposed a new “risk” on the subjects.  Thus, a study-created risk 
existed. 
But the Tuskegee Study involved another wrong that history seems to 
find equally troubling—standing by and allowing the men to live untreated 
because they did not know a treatment was available.  This consequence 
could have occurred even without the researchers actively deceiving or lying 
to the subjects.  And this element of the study comes through in many 
descriptions of its wrongs, even if more detailed facts of the active deception 
are not mentioned.  Consider the July 26, 1972 Washington Evening Star 
headline for the article that first exposed the Tuskegee Study: Human 
Guinea Pigs: Syphilis Patients Died Untreated.110  Associated Press reporter 
Jean Heller explained that “[f]or 40 years the United States Public Health 
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Service . . . conducted a study in which human beings with syphilis, who 
were induced to serve as guinea pigs, have gone without medical 
treatment . . . and a few have died of its late effects, even though an 
effective therapy was eventually discovered.”111  Both the headline and that 
simple sentence conveyed the core of the wrongdoing that stunned readers.  
And this core wrong still would have occurred merely by failing to let the 
men know that treatment existed. 
So would the Tuskegee Today hypothetical study encounter any 
regulatory stop signs under the view of the world discussed earlier in this 
Article?  Consider, for example, the proposal from the AAUP that would 
apply to studies whose methodology consists entirely of collecting data and 
conducting interviews.112  The proposed Tuskegee Today study would clearly 
comply with the AAUP proposal and, thus, would not require review by 
anyone who is part of the IRB system.  This outcome takes place largely 
because of the main proposition on which the AAUP rules are constructed: 
studies that are low risk—meaning that the researchers are not creating a 
risk by enrolling the subjects in the study—should not require ethical 
review.113  The Tuskegee Today hypothetical does not itself impose any risks 
on the subjects.  Therefore, it falls squarely within the category of studies the 
AAUP proposal exempts from ethical review. 
Similarly, when considering the concerns about public health research 
raised in the wake of the Kennedy Krieger Institute case, the Tuskegee Today 
hypothetical study would likely fall squarely within the parameters that 
Hoffmann and Rothenberg propose to address such concerns.  Hoffmann 
and Rothenberg contend that, at the least, it is “unclear” whether 
researchers have any duty to disclose risks that they do not create.114  They 
worry that creating such a duty, if it does not exist, might have a negative 
effect.115  In the Tuskegee Today hypothetical, no risks would indeed be 
created by the researchers, and so Hoffmann and Rothenberg’s discussion 
would, at the least, lead to some doubt about the existence of a duty for the 
researchers to give the subjects any information about disease X, including 
that an effective treatment exists. 
And lest the reader think that surely no one would try to apply these 
themes to allow a new version of the Tuskegee Study to take place—that if 
that fact pattern were raised, arguments would be made to ensure that such 
a proposed study receives appropriate review—there is direct evidence 
suggesting that this is not the case.  For example, leading IRB critic Philip 
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Hamburger directly addresses some aspects of what happened in the actual 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study in his Northwestern University School of Law 
Symposium article.116 
In critiquing The Belmont Report, which, as discussed above, laid the 
foundation for much of the current federal regulations,117 Hamburger 
concludes that it perpetuated a misunderstanding of “what was wrong about 
the Tuskegee Study.”118  His analysis, addressing issues similar to those 
raised in Part III above, explains that The Belmont Report’s analysis of the 
duties owed by researchers to subjects was mistaken. 
The Belmont Report’s version of Tuskegee raises questions as to whether the 
researchers there violated any duty to their subjects. . . .  Of course, if it is 
recognized that the researchers were doctors and others who held 
themselves out as offering health care, then the breach of a Hippocratic and 
fiduciary duty is obvious.  The Belmont Report, however, overgeneralizes 
about Tuskegee in terms of a general duty of researchers, and it thus leaves 
room for doubts as to what went wrong there.119 
Under Hamburger’s analysis, then, the primary wrong in the Tuskegee Study 
was due to the fact that the researchers were doctors and were violating the 
duties that they, as doctors, owed to patients.120  Thus, had the study been 
conducted by non-clinicians, such as PhDs who were experts in public 
health, presumably there would have been no similar duties owed to the 
research subjects flowing from their role as researchers.  This basis for the 
duties owed turns the wrongs committed in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study into 
mainly an issue of having chosen the wrong people to conduct the study.  
According to Hamburger’s viewpoint, it is a serious mistake to conclude that 
researchers owe a wide range of duties to subjects, particularly any that 
might fall under the category of “fiduciary” duties.121  Only professionals 
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such as physicians and attorneys have such duties, and, he notes, 
“[r]esearchers are not professionals.”122 
The Tuskegee Today hypothetical study raises, at the least, two 
important questions: First, could it be conducted without violating the 
existing rules for protecting research subjects?  Second, regardless of its 
status under the current rules, should society allow such a study to be 
conducted?  Both questions can be answered with a reasonable degree of 
certainty. 
A. Could Tuskegee Today be conducted without violating the existing rules 
for protecting research subjects? 
The history of the current rules recounted above provides a solid 
argument for concluding that the Tuskegee Today hypothetical study would 
violate current protections for human research subjects.  Admittedly, the 
wording of the federal regulations requiring the disclosure of “reasonably 
foreseeable risks”123 certainly suggests that this provision is mainly referring 
to risks created by a person’s participation in a study.  However, we are not 
interpreting this provision in a vacuum.  We must remember that what 
happened in the original Tuskegee Study was one of the motivating forces 
that led to the current rules. 
As noted above, there are revisionist analyses of the events in the 
Tuskegee Study that suggest that what happened was not as shameful as is 
generally claimed.124  But those analyses remain minority viewpoints.  The 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study likely still stands out as the research study in the 
United States that deserves the distinction of most “shameful.”125  Its legacy 
is not merely the current rules, but a persisting wariness among many 
African-Americans about whether they will be treated fairly by the medical 
system.126  A current demonstration of its continuing impact is the wide 
interest and debate generated by Harriet Washington’s recent book, 
Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black 
Americans from Colonial Times to the Present.127 
While there certainly can be a debate about the outer limits of a 
researcher’s duty to disclose to subjects risks not created by the researchers, 
surely that duty is embodied in the current regulations when (1) the 
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undisclosed risks relate to the very disease the researchers are studying, and 
(2) there would be substantial harms to the subjects from being kept 
ignorant of those facts. 
There is a word that every first year law student learns in studying 
contracts law, a word that provides an appropriate description of what it 
would mean to watch these men become sicker and sicker and withhold 
from them the single piece of information that could prevent that from 
happening: unconscionable.  Unconscionable contracts are those that 
shock the conscience.128  The relationships created in research studies do, 
to some extent, involve contract-like elements, as courts are beginning to 
recognize.129  They involve voluntary agreements entered into by researchers 
and subjects, describing the terms of what will happen during a research 
study.130  However, as with all contracts, there are limits to what society will 
accept in a very one-sided agreement. 
What happened in the original Tuskegee Study did indeed shock people 
when it was finally made public in 1972.  There is little reason to think that 
society has changed to so great an extent that such behavior would be less 
shocking to a modern-day audience.  Moreover, there is no reason to think 
that the shocking elements of the Tuskegee Study were confined to the 
intentional lies made to the subjects.131  Now that we have taken great steps 
to protect research subjects, and are proud of those protections, presumably 
we should be far less tolerant of behaviors by researchers that appear 
questionable. 
The core protection that the federal regulations afford research subjects 
is informed consent.132  Something would be very wrong if we interpreted 
the limits of that protection to allow people to participate in a study where 
the researchers are, in essence, shamefully exploiting the subjects’ 
ignorance.  Many aspects of modern research are troubling, including the 
fact that much of what we learn, we often learn from people who are in 
unfortunate circumstances.  For example, people may enroll in studies 
because they are poor and cannot afford healthcare.  By participating in the 
study they may receive treatments that they could not otherwise access. 
But however troubling other aspects of the research system may be, it is 
especially troubling, given the system’s emphasis on the protections of 
informed consent, to allow a study’s key element to rely on withholding a 
simple but critically important piece of information.  That circumstance 
would indeed be unconscionable and it is hard to believe that any current 
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IRB would ever approve such a study.  A current IRB would recognize that, in 
at least some circumstances, the federal regulations, consistent with the 
lessons of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study that helped shape them, do require 
researchers to disclose risks beyond those the researchers create themselves. 
B. Should our rules allow Tuskegee Today to be conducted? 
In evaluating whether our rules should allow researchers to conduct a 
study such as the Tuskegee Today hypothetical, we must first comment on 
the law of unintended consequences.  Much of the current debate about 
reforming the IRB system, and eliminating administrative reviews that do little 
to protect subjects, supposes that society should only care about those risks 
that are imposed on subjects by participation in a study.  For example, this 
supposition is the central premise of the AAUP’s proposed reforms.133 
However, as this Article has demonstrated, the roots of our system for 
protecting human subjects actually lie in studies where some of the most 
troubling aspects were due not to risks the researchers imposed, but rather 
to failure to disclose information about other risks not created by the study.  
There is no reason to believe that those concerns, and the reasons why we 
condemned such behaviors decades ago, have gone away.  Thus, we need 
to be wary of looking solely at the risks caused by participation in a study 
and concluding that when such risks are minimal, a study is minimal risk 
and, thus, requires no ethical review.  Some of the reformers might have 
inadvertently missed these types of concerns.  If these concerns were brought 
to their attention, they might well modify their proposed reforms to provide 
appropriate protections. 
Others, however, are raising the issue squarely but argue that by 
imposing certain disclosure duties on researchers, the government makes it 
harder to conduct some types of research, including studies that might have 
a substantial impact on public health.134  The first response to this 
proposition should be to ask, where is the empirical evidence that such 
disclosure duties will indeed substantially deter research? 
An excellent example for evaluating this issue is the Kennedy Krieger 
Institute lead paint study.  While the consent forms used in the study were far 
from ideal, they did provide information about the risks of lead poisoning in 
children.135  Furthermore, there is little reason to think that if that 
information had been provided more clearly it would have significantly 
altered the enrollment of families in the study.  After all, the reason the 
researchers conducted the study in the first place was that lead 
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contamination was endemic in inner-city Baltimore homes.136  Low-income 
parents had few choices other than to live in these homes.137  The 
underlying problem being studied had nothing to do with lack of 
information.  Rather, it was caused by the lack of money needed to remove 
the lead.138 
Thus, a family that was told the full details about the consequences of 
lead poisoning had no reason to change its behaviors.  Additionally, there is 
no reason to think that public health officials had been hiding the lead paint 
problem from Baltimore residents or that such residents were especially 
poorly informed about it.  The ultimate problem—and a very difficult one—
was that these residents had few other affordable choices for housing.  
Therefore, full disclosure about the hazards of lead poisoning would have 
had little impact on the study. 
On the other hand, failing to impose a disclosure duty on researchers 
could have a major, even crippling, consequence on public health and 
other research.  The concerns raised about the Kennedy Krieger Institute 
lead paint study, including claims that the researchers were trying to take 
advantage of the parents’ ignorance about lead poisoning,139 demonstrate 
how public outrage about researcher behavior may lead to a backlash that 
ultimately shuts down critically important studies. 
Another very prominent example of this phenomenon is the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) attempt to study the health effects 
on children of home pesticide use.  In 2004, the EPA designed an 
observational study called the Children’s Environmental Exposure Research 
Study (CHEERS), which would have involved families with young children 
that were using substantial amounts of pesticides in their homes.140  Scant 
information is available about whether currently available home pesticides 
might be causing medical problems in children.141  This study aimed to 
produce that information.142 
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The study became a political hot potato, embroiled in complicated 
claims and counterclaims, as Senate Democrats attacked it for 
inappropriately exposing young children to pesticide risks.143  Ultimately, in 
order to gain Senate confirmation of the nominee for the EPA permanent 
administrator, the EPA agreed not to conduct the study.144  What is 
especially interesting was the resonance this political in-fighting generated 
among various segments of the public, including certain religious groups, 
who vocally condemned the study.145  Even the usually staid New York Times 
editorialized that the study was “macabre.”146 
Two issues this debate raised were whether the researchers would inform 
parents of the known risks of pesticide use, and, if they saw parents 
incorrectly using pesticides, whether they would inform the parents of the 
misuse.147  The EPA indicated that it only wanted to study the “correct” use 
of pesticides and that it would inform parents about the known hazards from 
pesticide use and correcting misuse.148 
However, as noted, even with these clarifications, the study was so 
controversial that it never took place.149  Imagine the uproar if the EPA had 
tried to follow the approach outlined in Parts II and III of this Article under 
which researchers have no duty to disclose risks they do not impose 
themselves.  If the New York Times characterized the study as “macabre” 
before, what headlines might it write about a study in which EPA researchers 
observe parents misusing pesticides, expose children to such misuse, and 
take no action, relying on their “lack of a duty” to do anything? 
Or consider the hypothetical study that Hoffmann and Rothenberg 
propose where researchers want to study a population that uses a diet that 
exposes its children to certain nutritional deficiencies.  Imagine, for example, 
that children on this diet are suspected to have a high incidence of heart 
failure in the teen years.  What would the societal reaction be to learning 
that researchers stood by and conducted this study without even letting the 
parents and children know about these concerns? 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current IRB system is far from perfect, and there are many 
appropriate reforms that the government should make to ensure that it 
minimizes wasted effort and does not create unnecessary barriers to the 
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conduct of research.  However, in making those reforms, society needs to 
recognize that researchers owe important basic duties to research subjects 
that require them to disclose information about certain risks, even if the risks 
are not created by the researchers or preexisted the study. 
These basic duties reflect the core value of decent behavior that society 
expects from researchers.  The researchers breached these duties in the 
Tuskegee Study, resulting in appropriate public condemnation.  As President 
Clinton asserted, in the Tuskegee Study, our “nation broke the trust with our 
people that is the very foundation of our democracy.”150  We need to be 
careful that decades later we do not somehow lose sight of these basic 
disclosure duties in the race to make conducting research more efficient. 
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